Thank you, Senator. I will sum up my statement in

respect to your wishes.

Let me talk first about where we are in the peace process north-south.

I think you pretty well brought the hearing up to date on

where we are in terms of a significant breakthrough. We now have

the essence of the peace agreement in terms of the north-south

process. What we need to do next and what we will do next is attach

to that two annexes. One of the annexes will be the detailed

cease-fire process agreement, which will include things like demobilization,

positioning of people, and so forth. We expect the talks on

that subject to begin on June 22 and continue for at least 4 weeks.

The second missing part is an implementation date for the political

agreement that they have made, what is the date that the interim

agreement begins, et cetera, et cetera. We believe that as

soon as the cease-fire talks end, probably in the middle of July, we

will be able to move on to that. The Kenyan mediator actually

hopes to wrap these talks up in about 8 weeks from June 22. I

think he is optimistic, but I think, given the breakthrough and the

partnership that seems to have developed between Vice President

Taha and John Garang, it is not unreasonable to press for a quick

settlement.

One of the tragedies of this process—now let me turn to Darfur—

is that this agreement that they have just signed actually has the

kernel of settlement in it. The decentralization features, the power-sharing

features, et cetera, can solve the underlying political problem

in Darfur. We have urged and will continue to urge that these

partners in peace, Vice President Taha and John Garang, turn

their peace friendship in the direction of Darfur and act as national

leaders to help to begin to end this process. They have assured us

that they will do that and we are waiting for them to begin that

process. I think that is one of the necessary pieces that is missing

from this so far.

Let me turn to what we have done about the tragedy in Darfur.

We have already used the term ‘‘ethnic cleansing.’’ I think the Secretary

said it best and let me quote him:

So we are already as mobilized on this subject as we could be,

whether we call it genocide or not, although I agree we need to answer

that question, certainly for the record and certainly for holding

those that are responsible for it guilty. But as always, we are

faced with a tough dilemma: Do we pursue adequate relief immediately

and set aside our justice concerns in order to press for that?

We will not do that in the long run. We are in the process of trying

to come up with a list of people who are responsible, people

among the Janjaweed who are hoping to actually name, to begin

this process so that the impunity that several of the members have

referred to will begin to end here. And we will go further than that

if we do not get the kind of response we are hoping to get.

We are on this and we are pressing all parties. You quoted Mr.

Natsios. The reason Mr. Natsios and I were in Geneva was to rally

the assistance and the support, financial and otherwise, from the

European Community, to begin to turn their attention to this as a

serious process and not a case where the Americans are carrying

this out of proportion. I think we have begun that education process

and the Europeans are beginning to pledge money.

For instance, most tangibly, they pledged $15 million, and it is

the first money other than our million to hit the till, to get the African

Union [AU] cease-fire team on the ground and in place to begin

to have eyes and ears on the ground in an official sense, to begin

to force the government and the rebels to honor the cease-fire

agreement they have made.

I am somewhat optimistic that we can push this out the door and

we can actually have some success in this. When we began the

process in the Nuba Mountains we faced the same dilemma, getting

two parties who are fighting each other by no civilized rules

to stop. It took us 30 days, but it took us getting the monitors on

the ground to begin that process. So I have some reason to hope

if we can get the African Union moving—and it is moving—the

first elements are in Al Fashir and several other elements are moving

out to subordinate areas—that they may begin to reverse this

process.

Again, the $15 million that the European Union put on the

ground says that this is quite a serious process and that they intend

to respect it. More significantly than that, they have put men

on the ground, as we have. We have got our own men in this African

Union peacekeeping force——

Thank you, Senator. I think I will pick up by detailing

the actions we have taken in a more specific way than I was

doing. The President, the Secretary, the National Security Adviser,

Mr. Natsios, as I mentioned earlier, have all raised Darfur several

times with President Bashir, Vice President Taha, and of course

the Foreign Minister. The President issued a strong public statement

on April 7 in which he condemned the atrocities being committed

and insisted that the Government of Sudan stop the

Janjaweed violence.

Senior U.S. officials have visited Darfur several times since last

fall to call attention to the situation and to press the GOS to stop

the violence. In fact, we are now hoping to send out Pierre-Richard

Prosper, the Ambassador at Large for War Crimes, as well as the

Assistant Secretary Lorne Craner, to take a look at the human

rights situation before the end of the month.

In this same regard, we have pressed the United Nations to be

as active as possible and we have some assurances from Secretary

General Annan that he will attempt to visit Darfur as early as he

can, possibly later this month, but certainly before the African

Union summit begins in early July.

We played a decisive role in brokering the cease-fire between the

government and the Darfur armed opposition that was signed in

Chad on April 8. We followed up the last week of May in Addis to

help broker the agreement to actually deploy the monitors led by

the African Union to Darfur. The United States has pushed for a

special briefing on Darfur in the Security Council on April 7. This

in part put the pressure on Sudan to sign the cease-fire agreement

that they did on April 8.

The World Food Program Director and Acting High Commissioner

for Rights Berti Ramcharan briefed the Security Council

again May 7. The council has also heard from NGOs in an informal

session and has been briefed a third time.

We took the lead in drafting a strong Presidential statement that

the council adopted, after some negotiation May 25. That statement,

and I quote,

A U.S.-UK sponsored U.N. resolution was passed June 11 to welcome

the protocols at Naivasha. But at our insistence, the resolution

also refers to the situation in Darfur and ensures that the

United Nations Security Council will remain seized of this issue.

At our initiative, the U.N. chaired a June 4 Geneva meeting on

Darfur with donors to send a concerted message to the GOS and

to stimulate additional pledges to meet the urgent humanitarian

assistance needs. As you know, the United States has pledged $188

million, bringing our total planned contribution to nearly $300 million.

At the U.N. Human Rights Commission [UNHCR] meeting in

April this year, we co-sponsored a resolution calling for the appointment

of a Special Rapporteur for Sudan under item 9. The

head of our delegation made a strong statement in which he condemned

the atrocities taking place in Darfur and held the international

community accountable for a lack of action. Ultimately,

the CHR adopted a weaker decision, appointing only an independent

expert.

Finally, as I mentioned earlier in my statement, I want to underscore

that we have made it clear to the Government of Sudan we

will not normalize relations, even if there is a north-south peace

agreement, unless and until the GOS takes the steps necessary to

address the situation in Darfur.

These steps have resulted in some improvement in the situation,

but not nearly enough in the face of the enormity of this crisis, and

we continue to remain active on that front. I have given you what

we have done to date and I have begun to outline what we hope

to do. We will attempt to find those responsible and name them,

if we can, by name so that the idea of impunity does not become

attached to this crisis. And we will look at more and more extraordinary

steps as time goes by to force the Government of Sudan to

honor its pledges.

The simple fact of the matter, as Senator Feingold I believe

pointed out, is that despite the high level reassurances we have

had, we have been thwarted at many turns by the bureaucracy,

and we have made it very clear that this is not acceptable in the

face of the enormity of this crisis. In fact, I am hoping for the Secretary

to press this point again in the next day or so with the Foreign

Minister, who has become somewhat of an intermediary in

this process and begun to get some satisfaction for our demands on

the ground, but again not nearly enough.

Just to reiterate one last time, the administration considers resolving

the situation in Darfur to be one of its highest priorities.

We said so in our memorandum of justification that accompanied

the President’s certification under the Sudan Peace Act and we

have been faithful to that pledge. We have not stinted, certainly in

diplomatic channels, but our USAID colleagues have not stinted on

the practical side, from pushing this as far and as fast as we can.

I will close with that and let my colleague Roger Winter have his

say.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am honored to have the opportunity

to appear before you to discuss our government’s efforts to achieve a just and

comprehensive north-south peace accord, and to address the grave humanitarian

and human rights problems in Darfur. We are exerting strong leadership on both

issues and have made tremendous progress toward ending the north-south conflict

over the past three and a half years. We intend to use some tools that have proven

most effective to address the humanitarian and human rights crises in Darfur. The

situation in Darfur requires urgent attention, and will, if not resolved, negatively

affect prospects to conclude and implement a comprehensive peace accord between

the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement

(SPLM). Given the right resources, I am confident that we can end the tragedy in

Darfur.

The signing of the three protocols on power sharing, the two disputed areas of the

Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, and Abyei were a major breakthrough in efforts to

achieve a north-south peace accord. Both sides agree that all the substantive issues

have now been resolved. What remains is to work out the details of a formal

ceasefire and related security arrangements, and implementation modalities. In

their signing a declaration on June 5 in Nairobi, Vice President Taha and Chairman

Garang committed themselves to do this quickly. We are, therefore, hopeful that a

final comprehensive peace accord will be signed within the next 8-12 weeks. The situation

in Darfur complicates this process, however, and clouds prospects for implementation

of a peace accord. We are pushing the parties to sign a final peace accord

as soon as possible while simultaneously working to end the violence in Darfur.

The GOS and SPLM will meet on June 22, again under the auspices of the Intergovernmental

Agency on Development (IGAD), to work out a formal north-south

ceasefire agreement including details relating to disengagement and redeployment

of forces, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. We are sending a

strong team of experts to those talks to assist IGAD mediator Sumbeiywo. The security

talks will be followed by a session on modalities to implement the accords that

have been signed. Once these details have been worked out the GOS and SPLM will

sign a comprehensive peace accord encapsulating all the agreements that have been

reached.

Immediately following that, the six-month pre-interim period will begin, followed

by the six-year implementation period. We are working now to identify the resources

that will be needed to support implementation, as well as reconstruction and development.

A strong commitment of support will reinforce U.S. leadership in the peace

process and will enable us to push other donors to ensure equitable burden sharing

among the international community.

The title for this hearing, Mr. Chairman, asks the question ‘‘what price peace?’’

The price of war has been enormous. We estimate that over two million people have

died in the course of the north-south conflict, approximately 700,000 refugees have

fled the country, close to four million are displaced within Sudan, and development

has been severely retarded throughout the entire country. We cannot and will not

lessen pressure on the Government of Sudan and allow what is happening in Darfur

to continue in order to achieve a north-south peace accord. We have made clear to

both the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement that

peace throughout Sudan, including Darfur is essential to the implementation of a

north-south accord. Continued instability in western Sudan would fatally complicate

efforts to implement a north-south accord.

Even if this were not the case, the situation in Darfur would still merit the most

vigorous possible effort by the United States. The violence and atrocities being perpetrated

in Darfur simply must not be allowed to continue.

A humanitarian crisis of major proportions exists in Darfur. I want to review how

this situation developed and inform you about the steps we are taking to address

it. Darfur is an area where traditional conflicts between nomadic herders, who are

largely Arab, and sedentary agriculturalists, who are largely African Muslims, have

long existed. The government’s perceived marginalization of the region and favoritism

towards Arab tribes have contributed to growing popular dissatisfaction

among the three primary African groups: the Fur, Zaghawa, and Messalit. This dissatisfaction crystallized as the people of the region looked at the progress being

made in the north-south peace talks and became increasingly focused on the need

to address their grievances. There two armed opposition groups in Darfur: the

Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

Both groups draw some support as a result of western grievances, but neither group

has a clear political agenda. Although it is clear that the Government of Sudan is

responsible for the humanitarian and human rights crises, we should not assume

that the armed opposition groups are entirely without blame.

The emergence of armed opposition in Darfur has profoundly shaken the GOS because

it poses, in many respects, a greater threat than the activities of the SPLM

in the south. The SPLM has never threatened the north militarily; it is a southern

movement. Support for the JEM and SLM, however, comes from within the predominantly

Muslim population of Darfur; radical Muslim cleric Turabi has links to

the JEM. Moreover, over 50 percent of the Sudanese military is from the Darfur,

and that region is not far from Khartoum. A successful insurgency in Darfur would

fuel potential insurgencies in other parts of the north. This, I believe, explains why

the Government of Sudan has adopted such brutal tactics in Darfur. The GOS is

determined to defeat the JEM and SLM at any cost to the civilian population.

The effective military operations carried out by the SLM and the JEM, particularly

the attack on the regional capital of Al Fashir last year, raised grave concerns

within the GOS. As a result, the government launched an all-out effort to defeat

the armed opposition. As a major part of that effort, the government armed and supported

Arab-based ‘‘jingaweit’’ militias have attacked and displaced civilians. These

attacks are coordinated and supported by government security forces. African villages

have been systematically attacked in a scorched-earth type approach. Villages

are burned to the ground, water points destroyed, crops burned, and the people are

forced from their land. The African population has been brutalized by the jingaweit

through widespread atrocities including mass rape, branding of raped women, summary

killings, amputations, and other atrocities. Estimates of civilians killed range

between 15,000-30,000. As many as one million people have been displaced, and

tens of thousands have sought refuge across the border in Chad. All of this amounts

to ‘‘ethnic cleansing’’ on a large scale.

The United States has exerted strong leadership to stop the violence. We have

consistently told the Government of Sudan—at the highest levels—that it must take

the following steps on Darfur: end the jingaweit violence; agree to a ceasefire with

the armed opposition and allow international monitoring of the ceasefire; and allow

unrestricted humanitarian access.

I want to detail actions we have taken:

The President, Secretary of State, National Security Adviser, USAID Administrator

have raised Darfur with President Bashir, Vice President Taha, and Foreign

Minister Ismael.

The President issued a strong public statement on April 7 in which he condemned

the atrocities being committed and insisted that the GOS stop jingaweit

violence.

Senior U.S. officials have visited Darfur several times since last fall to call attention

to the situation and to press the GOS to stop the violence.

The United States played a decisive role in brokering a ceasefire between the

government and the Darfur armed opposition that was signed in Chad on April

8.

We then followed up the last week of May in Addis Ababa to help broker an

agreement to deploy international monitors, led by the African Union, to

Darfur.

The United States pushed for a special briefing on Darfur in the United Nations

Security Council (UNSC) on April 7; this helped pressure the GOS to sign the

ceasefire on April 8.

World Food Program Director and Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights

Berti Ramcharan briefed the Security Council again May 7. The Council has

also heard from NGOs in an informal session and has been briefed a third time.

The U.S. took the lead by drafting a strong Presidential Statement that the

Council adopted, after some negotiation, May 25. That statement ‘‘expressed its

grave concern over the deteriorating humanitarian and human rights situation’’

and ‘‘strongly condemn[ed]’’ the ‘‘indiscriminate attacks on civilians, sexual violence,

forced displacement, and acts of violence, especially those with an ethnic

dimension.’’

A U.S./UK sponsored UNSC resolution was passed June 11 to welcome the

three protocols at Naivasha. At our insistence, the resolution also refers to the

situation in Darfur and ensures that the UNSC will remain seized of this issue.

At our initiative the UN chaired a June 4 Geneva meeting on Darfur with donors

to send a concerted message to the GOS and to stimulate additional

pledges to meet the urgent humanitarian assistance needs. The United States

pledged $188.5 million bringing our total U.S. planned contribution to nearly

$300 million.

At the UN Human Rights Commission (CHR) meeting in Geneva in April of this

year, we co-sponsored a resolution calling for appointment of a special

rapporteur for Sudan under Item 9. The head of our delegation made a strong

statement in which he condemned the atrocities taking place in Darfur and held

the international community accountable for lack of action. Ultimately, the

CHR adopted a weaker decision, appointing an independent expert.

And finally, as I mentioned earlier in my statement, I want to underscore that

we have made clear to the GOS that we will not normalize relations—if there

is a north-south peace agreement—unless the GOS takes the necessary steps

to address the situation in Darfur.

The steps that we have taken have already yielded some results, though not

enough given the enormity of the crisis in Darfur. The ceasefire signed between the

GOS and the Darfur armed opposition provides a basis to end the violence. The

agreement specifically holds the GOS responsible to stop the activities of the

jingaweit militia. The ceasefire agreement provides for international monitoring,

and this is to be under the auspices of the African Union. With our logistical support,

the first team of monitors has just deployed to Darfur. In addition to representatives

from African countries, U.S. and European Union (EU) personnel are

members of the team. We are working with the AU to ramp up this team and to

begin investigations on an urgent basis. Getting these monitors on the ground and

helping them work effectively is of critical importance. You will recall the pivotal

role that getting monitors into Sudan has played in maintaining the ceasefire in the

north-south conflict and helping move political resolution to the conflict forward.

While there has been some diminution in violence and some improvement in humanitarian

access, the situation in Darfur remains grave. USAID estimates that as

many as 350,000 people could die over the coming months if humanitarian assistance

is not put in place urgently. However, most of the violence is being perpetrated

by the jingaweit. In addition, there have been several unconfirmed reports of aerial

bombardment and/or use of helicopter gun ships. Getting international monitoring

in place and stopping the jingaweit violence is crucial to facilitating unrestricted humanitarian

access. International humanitarian workers simply cannot gain access

to many areas while the violence is continuing. Moreover, those displaced fear receiving

humanitarian assistance, because that provokes further jingaweit attacks to

loot supplies.

The perpetrators of the violence and atrocities in Darfur must be held accountable.

The Government of Sudan has a responsibility to end the impunity in Darfur.

The perpetrators of the violence and atrocities in Darfur must be held accountable.

We described in detail in our Sudan Peace Act report the atrocities that are taking

place in Darfur. While the information available to us is far less precise than we

would like, we are working hard to identify those responsible. We are exploring actions

that we can take against these people, specifically by freezing assets they may

have in the United States and prohibiting the issuance of visas to them. We are

working hard with the UN and other partners to ensure that concerns about Darfur

received appropriate mention in any Security Council statements on the situation

in Sudan. It is also essential that the results of ethnic cleansing not be allowed to

stand. The African ethnic groups forced from the land must be allowed to return

voluntarily and their protection must be ensured.

The Administration considers resolving the situation in Darfur to be one of its

highest priorities. The Memorandum of Justification accompanying the President’s

certification to the Congress consistent with the Sudan Peace Act highlighted the

need for urgent action both to reach a north-south peace deal and to end the violence

in Darfur. The Memorandum made clear that the situation in Darfur was

taken into account in the determination. It specifically noted ‘‘Government-supported

atrocities in Darfur and hostilities in other areas have caused a major humanitarian

crisis and stimulated renewed skepticism about Government intentions.’’

It pointed out that the government’s actions in Darfur weaken our confidence that

it is committed to achieve peace throughout the country.

The progress in the north-south negotiations provides an important opportunity

to intensify efforts on Darfur and to test the Government’s commitment to peace.

Both Vice President Taha and Chairman Garang have told us they understand that

a north-south peace accord cannot be effectively implemented without peace in

Darfur and that they have pledged to work together to resolve the Darfur problem.

We intend to hold them to this commitment.

A political process will be essential as part of the solution for the problem in

Darfur. We are encouraging the Government and the armed opposition in Darfur

to have serious political discussions aimed at achieving a negotiated solution. The

agreements signed between the Government and the SPLM establish a national

framework for resolution of local grievances by providing strong provisions for a federal

structure and local autonomy.

The limited improvement in humanitarian access that has taken place and the

fact that there is at least less violence than there was before provides some basis

for hope. That said, it is by no means possible to say that we have turned the corner

on Darfur, and we must maintain relentless pressure on both the Government and

the rebels to take the necessary steps. The recent deployment of international monitors

will help establish a new reality on the ground and, therefore, to help end the

violence.

We have surprised the Government of Sudan by our tough actions on Darfur.

Clearly, the GOS had calculated that our desire to see a north-south accord might

lead us to adopt a softer approach on Darfur. That was a major miscalculation, and

the GOS now understands that. Our linkage of normalization of bilateral relations

with the GOS to GOS behavior in Darfur as well as to a north-south accord highlights

our seriousness. I take this opportunity once again to reiterate our message

to the GOS. Bipartisan congressional interest in this issue, as manifested by the

helpful congressional resolution on Darfur and this briefing helps send a clear message

that we do not intend to stand by while violence and atrocities continue in

Darfur. Our message to the Government of Sudan is clear: do what is necessary

now, and we will work with you. If you do not, there will be consequences. Time

is of the essence. Do not doubt our determination.

To the government, nothing. The government is restricted

under the terrorism rules and other things.

No. The humanitarian assistance is what goes on

there.

I think once the—assuming they finish this process

which I outlined maybe as early as mid-August if things are right,

there will be a two-step process. There will be something called the

pre-interim period, in which what is essentially a new union government

including John Garang and several key members of his

will take seats in the parliament, the executive branch, et cetera,

so the beginnings of the transformation of the government of Khartoum.

Six months later, there will be a full installation of what will be

the new government. There will be a 6-month interim period. During

this interim period I think we will begin to look at what it is

that makes sense to do, provided that they continue along this path

and honor the agreement. There will be benchmarks set.

Once they get to the new union government, hopefully by then,

because they have met the terrorism standards and other things

and they have stopped this Darfur business—this is the happy picture

I am painting for you—we would then resume normal relations

with Khartoum and take a look at specific categories of aid.

I think on the political side, as I have already outlined,

we have made it clear to them that normalization does not

come with Darfur in flames, and in fact we are in the process—and

I had this conversation actually with the Sudanese Vice President.

I find myself in the ludicrous position on the one hand talking

about lifting sanctions and on the other having to talk about trying

to increase sanctions on you and the Janjaweed in particular if you

do not take action immediately.

I made the point that I am not talking a month; I am talking

in weeks. This is too serious, and so far we are seeing too many

bureaucratic obstacles. So on the political side we are actually

threatening sanctions.

Now, we are under no illusion, given that they are sanctioned

under the terrorism act and under the IEPA and under a set of ten

different series of sanctions, that these sanctions will have anything

more than political and psychological impact. But it is one of

the things we are prepared to do to get their attention.

I am hoping we are not going to go there and, based on conversations

I had with the Foreign Minister, I think he gets it. The question

is can they reverse the bureaucracy, and what is in charge?

Is the peace faction in charge or not? We do not have the answer

to that question, and that goes to the heart of the issue. I cannot

make peace in all of Sudan unless the peace faction is in control

in Khartoum. And if they are, they should be able to deliver the

goods in Darfur as part of that peace process.

So we have already got a horrifying test, but nonetheless a very

valid test, of whether this peace process goes anywhere, and they

have chosen this test to be in Darfur.

I think actually this hearing is quite helpful. It

gives us a chance to say again publicly to the government what we

have said privately in a forum in which we are laying down very

specific benchmarks, that this has got to stop and we mean it. This

policy is not reversible. This is not a private conversation. So I

think the hearing itself is one of those things.

The fact that you have monitored this carefully with the Sudan

Peace Act has got their attention. The fact that we have received

letters that name government officials, saying to us, are these people

guilty of war crimes—all of those kinds of things have gotten

their attention. I think that my colleague may have some views on

the kinds of aid we are going to need. We are going to need more

aid if we succeed. If we do not succeed, the questions are going to

be very different and we will be talking to you and others about

that. But our time line on this has not run out yet.

Senator, as you may know from my curriculum

vitae, I have been in that business and I think what we are getting

is what we need on Sudan. I am satisfied that I get the kind of

coverage I want when I ask the specific questions and tell them

what I need. I am satisfied that they are doing what they can, and

they are doing enough to meet our needs.

For instance, thanks to commercial satellites, some of the photos

we used in Geneva to show the Europeans what we were talking

about are commercially available. But if I ask for additional details

and additional coverage, I get that when I ask for it. So I am satisfied

with what is going on there. And as you know, there is a major

counterterrorism effort there, so we do have adequate people on the

ground in my view.

We know in the past, several decades back, SPLM

elements actually trained some of these SLA and other rebels. We

have recent indications of some supply and support activities as

part of that continuing process, but the supply activity is much

more recent. And we have mentioned to Dr. Garang that he is now

a party of peace, not a party of war, and he needs to use these to

gain influence over the rebels so that we stop this process and they

honor the cease-fire.

Clearly the bulk of the IDPs that are moving, as my

colleague stated earlier, are moving into Chad. There have been incidents

before, and a device we never had to use. Actually, there

have been bombings inside Chad. We could have actually brought

this to the Security Council as a threat to international peace and

security because of the cross-border bombing activity.

That has been brought into check as a result of a series of meetings

the Chadian Government hosted at Abe´che´ and elsewhere to

try and encourage this process. There is still the occasional violation

of the border. The Chadian Government has been satisfied by

the responses of Khartoum on that military kind of activity. We

have pressed them not to be shy on this issue.

Nonetheless, the major influence on Chad is the presence of

these large numbers of IDPs. It is somewhat mitigated by the fact

that in this particular area these ethnic groups are contiguous

across both sides of the border, the Zaghawa in particular, so there

is some taking in of families which mitigates this, but does not go

anywhere near close to how far it has to be gotten.

The good news on the Chad side is we are getting in fairly decent

amounts of resources. The Chadians are posing no obstacle to us

on that side of it.

The impact in the Central African Republic [CAR] has been less,

less noticeable, but nonetheless of some significance, given the sad

state of that country, frankly. They cannot afford to take any IDPs.

But again, it is not a case of access; it is a case of, frankly, lack

of facilities and roads and things to move things in, not the government

obstructing us.

I think there are two factors at work here. The

truth is, because we have been so intimately involved in this process,

we know more on the ground. But because we have also been

engaged as the leading enemy of the Government of Sudan with

the terrorism act and other things, there is a certain hesitation

when we step out first with the facts to automatically accept them.

There is always that sophisticated crowd that says there may be

two motives here, let us wait a minute.

I think we saw that change in Geneva. We did not see it change

with enough money from my point of view, and Roger can probably

talk more effectively to that than I can. But the rhetoric now on

the European side is with us and that is a change and that has

happened recently. Again, I just think it is we are closer to the

problem, we know more. We went out of our way to get to these

rebels right away and kind of shape them a bit so that there could

be some serious discussion and a cease-fire could be set up.

There was some fear, I am sure, on some of our European colleagues

that we were supporting yet another guerrilla movement

as opposed to driving toward a realistic peace. I think we have corrected

that problem.

The African Union has, to use the euphemism,

stepped up to the plate in this case. We were glad to see them

being much more responsive than the old Organization of African

Unity was. They have a serious plan. They are proposing to put

120 monitors on the ground and a protection force of 270 men.

They have made it known to the Europeans and us what they

need to do that in terms of money and assistance. The European

Union has put I believe it is $14.1 million into the till in Addis.

We have supplied an emergency in-kind kind of assistance, taking

from our CPMT which is operating in the Nuba Mountains a couple

of planes, three or four of our logistics contractors, our political officer

from Khartoum, who has become the best friend of the AU in

the field in Al Fashir and elsewhere, to facilitate this process.

They have now begun to deploy. The advance elements are down

in Al Fashir and there are two forward elements. I believe one is

in Nyala and there is another one in Kebkabiya. They are beginning

to move out. The Nigerian commander has not yet arrived on

the scene, but the senior people in the AU that have been handling

this, particularly former President of Mali Konare, has been very

aggressive in getting what he needs from them and very aggressive

in seeking assistance from the Europeans and us. The AU representative,

Ambassador Djinnit, has been very engaged in this

and helpful. Sam Ibok in the AU has been very engaged and helpful.

So key people have stood up to this and the question is, unfortunately

for us, this is the AU teething on this crisis. They are doing

what they can. We are helping them. We have got men on the

ground and ready. They have agreed and we have agreed to supply

several Americans. There are three Americans on the ground already.

There is a British colonel. He will be joined by a couple of

others. There is a couple of Belgians and a Frenchman. A total of

eight Europeans in addition to our own will be in there.

So we will participate. This will not be a case of the AU being

out there without significant European assistance, both to say that

we are with them, but also to provide what we can in a more direct

way in terms of logistics to get this thing up and running.

My understanding is there was some money earmarked

in that original Iraq supplemental, not the Liberia money,

that we could use for this. My understanding—and I will check—

is that we are not trying to take anything from Liberia for this.

That is correct.

There will be 120. They have actually identified the

nations and the numbers that will come. So far there is far less

than that. There is about, by my count, about 32 on the ground at

this point, either in Al Fashir or forward. They will get up to that

120 number as soon as these countries supply the manpower. They

know what countries they are coming from.

We have got indications by checking in the capitals that the

country involved is serious and has identified the men and is moving

them. We are trying to assist in that in various places.

Again, this goes to our experience in the Nuba

Mountains. Our experience there leads us to believe that, given our

relationship with the rebels and the time we spent with them and

given what we know about the government’s capability, if it wants

to honor the cease-fire, as long as we have a reasonable number

of monitors—and 120 is, based on our Nuba experience, reasonable

enough for at least a start of this, a serious start of this—we can

monitor the cease-fire and hold those that violate it responsible.

It will also take other forms of assistance. Senator Feingold alluded

to our intelligence. We will not spare providing that when we

have to if we think things are being missed or to target and move

people in the right direction to see what they need to see. But if

our experience in the Nuba Mountains instructs this experience, it

is possible to do this with 120 and 270, at least start it.

Clearly, Ambassador Djinnet and others that are running this

have made it clear to us that they will not hesitate, if they think

they need more, to come back and ask more. Again, it is a teething

process. I doubt the AU at this point could do much more than this

and we need to experience how they do this piece in order to reinforce

it.